An Embarrassing Episode in the History of the Law of
Evidence
John H. Mansfield∗
There may be value in attempting simply to give an account of
the events that have brought us to the present state of affairs
regarding the admissibility of expert testimony, a state of affairs that
may fairly be described as a conceptual muddle containing within it a
threat to liberty and popular participation in government. Such an
account may force out of concealment mistakes that have been made
and instill the will to remedy them, or at least to limit their damage.
The first task is to characterize the law that obtained before
1
Daubert regarding the admissibility of what for convenience we may
refer to as expert testimony. It seems permissible to say, if we leave
2
aside the complication created by Frye, that expert evidence was
admissible if relevant, meaning by relevant that it would justify a trier
of fact in altering probabilities on a disputed issue in the light of
background beliefs that could reasonably be imputed to the trier of
fact—in the case of a jury, beliefs held by a substantial proportion of
the population. This assumes that the evidence did not pose a
significant risk of any of the undesirable effects we now find
3
catalogued in Rule 403. Concededly the notion that an expert must
be qualified provided an opening for a more serious limitation on
4
admissibility, but in practice this requirement could easily be
satisfied, usually by the mere recital of formal credentials. Certainly
an opinion that an expert might express was not required to have any
5
particular probative value.
Decisions regarding the admissibility of expert testimony were
focused not on the probative value of the evidence, nor on whether
the expert was a real expert in the sense that he was providing correct
∗

John H. Watson, Jr. Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
3
FED. R. EVID. 403 [hereinafter Rule 403 or 403].
4
See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 28-29 (1954).
5
See id. at 363 (“Any relevant conclusions which are supported by a qualified
expert witness should be received unless there are other reasons for exclusion.”).
1

77

78

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34:077

information, but on whether the jury should be informed about the
matter to which the witness proposed to testify through the formal
process of evidence introduced at trial, or through the informal
process of jury notice, the jurors simply taking into account what they
already knew from their own experience. Thus if the question was
whether a witness who described himself as an “accidentologist”
should be allowed to give an opinion about the point of impact
between two vehicles, the question was not whether his opinion was
correct, but whether the information he would provide was not
widely known, and so properly should be presented in open court
6
and subjected to adversary testing.
In addition to concern with the allocation of information
between the formal and the informal processes, pre-Daubert decisions
addressed the question of whether a witness should be allowed to
testify using broad characterizations, drawing inferences, and
expressing conclusions, or be confined to specifics, a question we
7
associate with the Opinion Rule now embodied in Rule 701.
Discussion of this question assumed that the witness’s information
properly was channeled through the formal process of presenting
evidence at trial, the only question being the form it should take. In
most situations involving what is loosely referred to as expert
testimony, the information that it was desired to be provided the trier
of fact could not be effectively communicated unless the witness used
generalizations, inferences, opinions and so forth. In the case of
what we may call for the moment nonexpert witnesses, on the other
hand, it was often possible to insist that the witness be specific
without there being any risk of loss of relevant evidence. The release
from the constraints of the opinion rule of witnesses who had
complex information to communicate did not imply, however, that
these witnesses’ testimony was required to be more than relevant, or
that because they might be loosely characterized as experts that they
had to be real experts in the sense of oracles of undoubted truth.
In all of this pre-Daubert law, there was no suggestion that
evidence, to be admissible, had to be capable of being understood in
a particular way by jurors, or that jurors had to be able to follow the
reasoning of the expert. All that was required was that the evidence
be relevant in the sense referred to above. There was no suggestion
that evidence, in order to be allowed before the jury, had to carry
with it a capacity for educating them to a certain level of
6
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understanding, either that attained by the witness himself or the level
that might be attained by an intelligent, generally informed judge.
The decision whether to educate was left to the parties: in a particular
case, if a party did not provide material that would enable the jurors
to understand, the verdict might go against him. What capacity for
education the jurors would have would be determined by the basic
requirements for jury service regarding intelligence and background
information, but whether this capacity would be utilized by the
evidence actually introduced was not something policed by the rules
of admissibility.
Exclusion on the grounds of prejudice, confusion of issues, waste
of time and so forth—the evils now catalogued in Rule 403—did not
in any way contradict what has just been said about the easy
admissibility of expert testimony pre-Daubert. None of the 403 evils, a
risk of which justified exclusion unless outweighed by probative value,
could be posited of expert testimony as such: disregard of the
substantive law; disregard of the burden of proof; giving way to
emotion; confusion of issues or misleading the jury, in the sense of
not being clear about the different questions under the substantive
law and to which of them evidence might be relevant; waste of time
because the evidence replicated evidence already presented; or
cumulativeness. If there was a substantial risk of the occurrence of
one or more of these evils, then the probative value of the evidence
offered had to be considered, but not if all that could be said of the
evidence was that it was expert evidence.
It is in Frye that we may espy the roots of our present troubles.
They are to be found not in the well-known uncertainties as to what is
the non-official body that must accept the evidence, in what sense
must the body accept it, and why should the law defer to the opinion
of a non-official group regarding the probative value of evidence, but
in the erection of the idea of “scientific evidence” as a legal category
having consequences for admissibility. But the damage inflicted by
Frye was limited, at least in its immediate consequences. In the first
place, Frye appeared to be restricted to “novel” scientific evidence,
which might have exempted evidence of a sort that had been around
for some time, even though of slight probative value. Furthermore,
there was no implication in Frye that its requirement might spread to
the whole area of expert testimony. The Frye rule, even as narrowly
conceived and applied to novel scientific evidence, was not
universally accepted, and in the years preceding Daubert, there were
8
signs of resistance to it. It is one of the ironies of our story that this
8
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resistance to Frye led to a regime that has turned out to be much
more restrictive and extensive in its application than Frye itself.
9
Next came the enactment of Rule 702. There was nothing in
the text or legislative history of 702 that would justify finding an
intention to erect a barrier to the admissibility of expert testimony
higher than the one that already existed. Of course, there was the
question of the effect of 702 on cases that fell within the ambit of
Frye—“novel scientific evidence”—but if account is taken of the
resistance that had been growing to Frye, a defensible interpretation
of 702 could have been that it abolished Frye and left the law of
admissibility of expert testimony much as McCormick suggested it was
10
and ought to be. In Daubert, the Court did indeed say that 702
abolished Frye, but then announced another rule governing the
admissibility of expert testimony, the consequences of which we are
now experiencing. In my own view, Rule 702 should have been read
not to impose this new requirement, but simply to have affirmed the
distinction, already referred to, between information that should
come through the formal process and information that should come
through the informal process of jury notice. The phrase “qualified as
an expert,” which does appear in 702, should have been read to
mean only that the witness had or claimed to have information that
did not fall within the area of jury notice, not that this information
must stand up to any particular test of reliability. The same is true of
the language about “assisting” the trier to determine a fact in issue.
This clause, as I see it, also is simply an affirmation of the distinction
between what may come in at trial and the information jurors already
have. This was made pretty clear by the Advisory Committee’s
quotation, in its Note to Rule 702, of Professor Ladd’s article in which
he stated:
There is no more certain test for determining when experts may
be used than the common sense inquiry whether the untrained
layman would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the
best possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment
from those having a specialized understanding of the subject
11
involved in the dispute.
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The Court in Daubert seized upon the word “science” in Rule 702
and based its holding upon what it thought to be a correct reading of
that term. In this, I believe, the Court made a fundamental error,
treating the case before it as one presenting a narrow question of
textual analysis, rather than seeing it as raising for discussion the
broad purposes of the law of Evidence in the light of its history and
12
the value of jury trial. There is no reason to think that the word
“science” was put into 702 other than as a convenient though vague
reference to a subclass of cases within the broad class of cases
involving specialized knowledge, specialized in the sense that it is not
already possessed by a proportion of the population of substantial
size. The way was paved for this mistake by Frye’s use of the category
“scientific evidence,” and its attaching specific consequences to that
category in regard to admissibility. In Daubert, the Supreme Court
adopted and confirmed the legal category “science,” and then went
on to attach different consequences than had Frye. There was
uncertainty following the Daubert decision as to whether it had made
it more or less difficult for expert testimony to gain admission, a
harbinger of the confusion that now surrounds the whole subject of
the admissibility of expert testimony.
Seizing upon the word “scientific” in 702, as just said, the Court
in Daubert then went on to determine that to be “science,” evidence
had to be “scientifically valid” or “good science,” and that this sort of
science could only be the result of the “scientific method.” The truth
is that among people who consider themselves in some sense
scientists, there is no clear understanding or agreement about what is
meant by “science,” “good science” or “the scientific method.”
Furthermore scientists who might be willing to give an account of
how they go about their work, would probably disclaim responsibility
for attaching any great significance to their account beyond its
justifying the decisions they make regarding further research. By
contrast, there are people sometimes referred to as philosophers of
science. These people do talk about the scientific method and
scientific validity. Some of them are cited in the Daubert opinion—
13
Karl Popper most notably. It is not at all certain, however, that the
Court understood these writers correctly, or even if it did, why legal
consequences should be attached to their ideas. Even if the Court is
correct in Daubert about what is science, what is the scientific method,
12

See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE
COMMON LAW 2 (1898) (referring to “the deep political significance of the jury and
its relation to what is most valued in the national history and traditions of the English
race”).
13
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.

82

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34:077

and what is scientific validity, the chief flaw in the Court’s opinion is
its failure to connect its analysis of these matters to any policy of the
law of Evidence. This failure originates in its threshold mistake of
treating the case as presenting a narrow problem in textual
interpretation. If the result of Daubert is to require that scientific
evidence, to be admissible, must be not merely relevant, but
reliable—that is to say, have a certain probative value—Daubert gave
no reason for this requirement other than that unless evidence has
this probative value, it is not really science or scientifically valid.
What were the forces at work that led to the Daubert decision? In
the first place, one must mention the powerful economic interests
that saw themselves under threat from large jury awards arguably
traceable to the admission of evidence of a causal connection
between their products and injuries. Writers and lawyers in the
service of these interests launched a campaign to attack the purveyors
of this evidence.
In particular they initiated a campaign of
sloganeering, employing such labels as “junk science” or “faux
14
science” or “bad science,” aimed at casting scorn on those who
testified to opinions thought to warrant these labels.
It is
embarrassing to concede that this kind of sloganeering may have
influenced the course of the law.
Another factor contributing to the Daubert decision was the
desire of some judges to be associated with science, if not as full
insiders, at least as knowledgeable associate members. Their desire
was to connect themselves with the most prestigious form of
knowledge in our contemporary world: scientific knowledge. Even if
one does not practice science or the philosophy of science, to know
what scientists do, and to be seen to know it, enhances self-esteem
and status in our society. Even when this knowledge is of a fairly
primitive sort, as it usually is for judges, lawyers, law clerks, and law
professors, generally being based on college courses and popular
books on science, its possession places a person above the common
run. But here we can truly say, as the old adage has it, that a little
knowledge is a dangerous thing. In this case, it led the Court away
from the sufficiently difficult job of discerning and implementing the
purposes of the law of Evidence, into an attempt to shine with the
reflected glory of science, in the light from a star only half
understood, and which in any case had its own purposes quite
unrelated to law.
14
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Not to be left out of account as a factor contributing to Daubert is
the anger and scorn that elite scientists feel toward what they
consider bad science. They persuade themselves, or have been
persuaded by interested lawyers, that persons who represent
themselves to be scientists and claim to know something about which
they, the elite scientists, know much more, in being allowed to testify
in courts of law are damaging the reputation of science and
undermining its mission. They are persuaded that if “junk science” is
allowed in courts, this somehow will adversely affect the standards for
academic appointments in science, government funding of scientific
research, and other important matters. There is no reason to think
there is any connection whatever between these matters and the
standards for the admission of evidence in courts, but elite scientists,
who think little about the purposes of law, believe there is, and their
disapproval of courts’ listening to inferior scientists has been skillfully
communicated to judges, who, as already stated, aspire themselves to
be approved by elite scientists.
Finally, also to be taken into account as a factor contributing to
Daubert is an ideology, far from decisively eliminated in our political
debates, which cannot see the sense in entrusting to twelve persons
picked at random from the general population important and
difficult questions of fact. Reservations coming from this perfectly
reasonable political philosophy find place in the bosoms of some
judges. They reveal themselves in the Daubert opinion’s conflicting
passages that on the one hand praise the ability of the jury to answer
15
difficult questions and on the other hand question it. But in this
debate, the Constitution has taken one side.
As already indicated, there does not exist outside the law any
settled meaning for the terms “science” or the “scientific method.” If
there were such a settled meaning, it still would have to be explained
how the purposes of the law will be achieved by carrying that
meaning over into a legal context and attaching to it the particular
consequence of admissibility. What is the precise shape of the legal
idea “science” that Daubert created? We do not know. The Court says
in its opinion that that case was presented to it as one involving
scientific evidence, and that since it was so presented, the evidence
16
must satisfy certain requirements. It did not need to decide, the
Court stated, whether these requirements or others would apply in
the case of nonscientific evidence. Of course, in avoiding telling us
what is scientific evidence, the Court failed to root its requirement
15
16
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that scientific evidence be more than relevant in any understanding
of the phenomenon of “science” that gave rise to the requirement in
the first place.
Daubert tells us that if evidence is scientific, it must have a certain
probative value to be admissible. This is simply because it is scientific
or is claimed to be. This is what all the talk about “scientific validity”
and reliability comes down to—the requirement of a certain
probative value. The idea is no different from that contained in 403.
Under 403, however, the reason for requiring a certain probative
value before evidence is admitted is the risk of the occurrence of the
specific evils already mentioned: the jury will ignore the substantive
law, the jury will disregard the burden of proof, the jury will be swept
away by emotion, and so forth. These evils can be seen as such and
taken into account through the exclusion of evidence without
attacking the very reason for having jury trial: that the verdict may
reflect beliefs about the world held by ordinary people and the
working of average intelligences.
To require that “scientific
evidence” be excluded unless it has a certain probative value simply
because it is scientific, does not rest upon apprehension of any of the
evils listed in 403, but directly attacks the fundamental reasons for
jury trial.
Daubert based its requirement that the evidence there involved
be reliable on the fact that it was scientific, but did not explain the
distinction between science and nonscience, nor draw from such a
distinction reasons for a particular requirement in the case of
17
scientific evidence. In Kumho, the distinction between the scientific
and the nonscientific was found to be unmaintainable and
disappeared, and with its disappearance there also disappeared the
reason given in Daubert for a requirement of reliability. In these
circumstances, the alternatives were to reconsider Daubert and see
whether it was possible to come up with a rationale for requiring
reliability other than the one based upon the mere fact that evidence
was scientific, and if this effort failed, to abandon the result in Daubert
and allow evidence in simply if relevant, or to extend the
requirement of Daubert to all expert testimony. The latter course was
taken and it was taken, furthermore, without justification offered.
The result in Daubert was assumed to justify imposing the reliability
requirement on evidence of the sort presented in Kumho. This is the
embarrassing episode referred to in the title to this article. Such a
finesse probably would not have been possible if Kumho had come
before Daubert.
17
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If Kumho is accepted, then all expert testimony must have a
certain probative value to be admitted: relevance is not enough. The
collapse of the distinction between science and nonscience has led to
this extension to all expertness. But the distinction between expert
and nonexpert evidence itself is vulnerable and subject to collapse,
and if this distinction goes and the Court responds in the same way it
did to the collapse of the science/nonscience distinction, then what
we face is the extension of a reliability requirement to all evidence.
Some commentators may attempt to ward off this outcome by
invoking a distinction between fact and opinion witnesses. They will
say that Kumho, of course, should not be extended to “fact witnesses.”
But all witnesses are fact witnesses in that they seek to inform the jury
about the facts of the world, even if in some cases they are allowed to
do so by the use of opinions and inferences.
The distinction earlier referred to between information that may
come through the informal process of jury notice—possibly because
the information is possessed by a group of substantial size in the
community—and information that may be introduced into evidence
18
at trial, a distinction implicit in the idea of relevance in Rule 401,
policed by Rule 701, and affirmed in Rule 702, and which indeed is
fundamental in our procedure, has nothing to do with any distinction
between expert and nonexpert evidence. In the argument over
whether there is an intelligible distinction between expert and
nonexpert evidence, all the evidence spoken of is assumed to come
properly through the formal process.
Most people agree that if the expert/nonexpert distinction
breaks down with the consequence that all evidence to be admissible
must have a certain probative value, there will be a grave impairment
of jury trial. This is especially so if probative value is to be judged in
the light of background beliefs other than those that may be ascribed
to reasonable jurors. In Daubert, the Court indirectly suggested that
an exclusionary rule such as the hearsay rule and the requirement
that witnesses be competent support its suggestion that imposing a
requirement of reliability on the admission of evidence is not unusual
19
in the law of Evidence. But in the case of the familiar exclusionary
rules, as in the case of Rule 403, a requirement of a certain probative
value or even a flat rule of exclusion is a response to a particular
danger, not a direct challenge to the main point of jury trial.
Propelling some along this path step by step to the final
conclusion that all evidence must be reliable to be admissible, not
18
19
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stopping to ask whether the first step was a mistake, is the underlying
belief, earlier referred to, that poorly educated, average citizens do
not contribute much to fair adjudication, but instead return verdicts
that often are inaccurate, and that whatever political advantages may
accrue from jury trials, they do not justify the continuance of this
state of affairs. As has been frequently observed, statements that
jurors render inaccurate verdicts are not supported by much
20
empirical evidence.
In the first place, to state that a verdict is
incorrect implies a source of undoubted knowledge of the truth,
when often there is no such unquestionable source. Furthermore,
even if it is the case, as it surely is, that mistaken verdicts have been
returned, there is no warrant for believing that another tribunal
would not have made the same mistakes: a judge is as likely to be
misled by a claimed eyewitness as a jury.
Sometimes an interest in displacing the jury is attempted to be
masked by a suggestion that all that is sought by an admissibility
requirement of reliability is to aid the jury in discharging its function
in the best possible manner. Assistance takes the shape of excluding
evidence concededly relevant unless it comes in a form that permits
the jury to be properly educated, so that its verdict will be the fruit of
rational analysis. If the evidence must be capable of bringing the jury
to a certain level of understanding, to what level? Surely it cannot be
suggested that they must be brought to the same level as the expert
witness himself. It seems clear—indeed Professor Allen concedes as
much in his contribution to the present symposium—that the
insistence on the educational power of evidence is in the service of
producing more accurate verdicts: “Does the expert in fact possess
knowledge useful to this trial that is being brought to bear upon it in
21
a way that increases the probability of accurate outcomes?” Thus,
although Kumho’s requirement that expert evidence be reliable and
the insistence that evidence have a certain educational power may be
distinguishable on the surface, beneath they derive from the same
conviction that jury verdicts are not as accurate as other forms of
adjudication and that there are no good policy reasons why an
inferior form of fact-finding should be accepted.
Defects in our procedural system that produce inaccurate
judgments are, of course, a matter of serious concern. It should not
be assumed, however, that inaccuracies result from the use of juries,
rather than being attributable to some other aspect of the system.
20
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Thus, the proper functioning of the adversarial system may be
impaired in certain situations—in many criminal prosecutions, for
example—by an inequality of resources or a difference in lawyers’
abilities. It may be possible directly to address these inequalities. If
this is not possible, in certain situations an exclusionary rule that
addresses a specific malfunctioning of the adversary system may be
appropriate. The special exclusionary rules relating to lineup
evidence are an example. But such rules operate to protect one side
against the superior power of the other, and are not across-the-board
exclusionary rules of the sort established by Daubert-Kumho, where the
rule excludes expert evidence unless it is shown to have a certain
probative value.
It is difficult to predict the future. It is impossible to imagine
that the Court will dismantle the Daubert-Kumho regime and return to
the regime of easy admissibility that existed before Daubert, at least
when “novel scientific evidence” was not involved. There seems little
possibility of legislative intervention or of any remedial proposal
coming from the Advisory Committee, especially since it has only
recently sponsored an amendment of Rule 702 that brings it into
express accord with Daubert.
As efforts by lower courts to apply Daubert continue, if confusion
about its meaning persists and conflicts among the circuits develop,
an appreciation of the need for some kind of adjustment may grow.
Confusion and conflict may increase as a result of the extension of
the reliability requirement to all expert evidence. Conflict among
the circuits will develop because some courts of appeal, in an effort to
give some structure and semblance of law to rulings on admissibility,
will attempt to spell out the “factors” that a trial judge must consider
in ruling on admissibility, and perhaps even pursue the hopeless
effort to distinguish expert method from expert conclusion, applying
the Daubert-Kumho requirement only to the former. Other courts will
routinely uphold the exercise of discretion by the trial court,
whichever way it went on the question of reliability. In those circuits
in which the latter approach is taken, a high degree of inconsistency
among trial court rulings on the admissibility of expert evidence will
become apparent.
Inconsistency in results is, of course, a state of affairs we
frequently accept for practical reasons and because of competing
values. If the same evidence had been put before a different trier of
fact, whether judge or jury, the result might well have been different.
Inconsistency in rulings on the admissibility of evidence, the
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supposed application of law by the judge, is harder to accept.
Nevertheless we do accept it to a degree in the case of rulings under
Rule 403. The Frye rule probably did function to give a certain
measure of consistency and predictability to rulings on the
admissibility of the sort of evidence it addressed—novel scientific
evidence. The pre-Daubert approach to other expert evidence also
produced a considerable consistency in rulings on admissibility, since
most proffered expert testimony was admitted, at least if the witness
was deemed qualified. In any case, inconsistency among rulings on
the admissibility of expert evidence is not likely to produce remedial
action unless it is accompanied by an increased realization of the
seriousness of the inroad that Daubert-Kumho has made on the right to
jury trial.

22

Inconsistency in the substantive standards for assessing expert
testimony is troublesome: it means that similarly situated litigants are
treated differently based on where they litigate, and it promotes forum
shopping. Moreover, apparently arbitrary differences among courts
evaluating similar testimony weaken the justification for removing
reliability determinations from the jury in the first place.
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